



T unisia is an economic success story — butexcessive demands on the country’s limited
water supply may compromise that success.
With annual growth rates reaching as high as 5%,
Tunisia saw its per capita income increase more
than five-fold between 1960 and 1997. Meanwhile,
the proportion of its population living below the
poverty line dropped from 22% to 6.2% between
1975 and 1995.
Advances such as these have catapulted Tunisia
out of the ranks of underdeveloped countries. Now
considered an “emergent economy,” three-quarters
of Tunisia’s population are classified as middle
class. This positive economic portrait and generally
equitable distribution of wealth have also helped
Tunisia avoid the political instability that has
plagued many other countries in the Middle East
and Northern Africa.
One remarkable feature of Tunisia’s accomplish-
ments is that they have occurred despite a water
shortage. With an annual water supply of 430
cubic metres per person, Tunisia is well below the
World Bank’s definition of a water-scarce country —
that is, one with less than 1,000 cubic metres per
person.
Now, there are clouds on the horizon. Agriculture
and other sectors that have propelled Tunisia’s
growth have been developed with little regard to
water efficiency, raising the prospect of a depletion
of water stocks that could trigger a crisis. The
government took aim at this problem in a policy
paper released in 1990, but its solutions focused
mainly on the costly process of developing new
supplies. References to water conservation
remained vague and unconnected to the
government’s broader strategy.
Expanding the equation
IDRC saw an opportunity to broaden the policy
debate in Tunisia. Around the same time that
Tunisia released its policy paper, the Centre began
a research program on Water Demand
Management (WDM) strategies — i.e., looking
primarily at demand rather than supply.
Researchers believed that Tunisia clearly stood to
benefit from this kind of approach. Since most of
its new water supplies had been identified or
developed, the potential for Tunisia to meet future
demand by boosting supplies was limited. More
promising were the avenues being opened up by
researchers like Professor Mohammed Salah
Matoussi of Tunis University, a rising academic star
who was beginning to explore the roles that
economic mechanisms (such as tariffs) could play
in promoting water conservation.
In supporting Professor Matoussi’s research, IDRC
saw the potential for Tunisia to benefit both
environmentally and economically. An IDRC study
of the project (written by Tracy Tuplin, based on
research by IDRC’s Sarah Earl and Bryon Gillespie)
recounts that: “The principal objective of the WDM
in Tunisia project was to develop an integrated
water demand management strategy in Tunisia that
would result in more effective use of limited water
resources, prevent rationing in the face of eventual
shortage, and delay heavy infrastructure
investments to increase supply.”
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Changing water policy by degrees
A project initially ignored by government has become part of a paradigm shift
When Tunisia set its sights on averting an approaching water crisis, it concentrated
overwhelmingly on increasing supply. An IDRC-supported research project with a
focus on demand did little to change this. But the project seems to have contributed
to a longer-term shift in outlook. Today, it also provides a reminder of the need to
communicate technical findings in ways policymakers understand.
IDRC also hoped that any success it achieved with
WDM in Tunisia would serve as an example to
other countries in the region.
An intention to influence policy
From the outset, the plan was to achieve those
goals by directly influencing policymakers. Tuplin
writes that, when the project’s parameters were first
defined, “significant time was spent on … reviewing
strategies to ensure the work would inform water
policy in the region.” It was clearly understood that
there should be “more focus on policy
implications rather than the development of
economic models.”
For a while, it appeared that the project would
make its mark in Tunisia’s policy-making arena.
Partway through the project’s lifespan, internal
IDRC documents showed considerable enthusiasm
for results such as the citation of the project’s
research in government reports and an apparently
new interest by bureaucrats in issues like tariff
systems. One report concluded that: “This has
been a highly successful project that physically
succeeded in drawing attention to the demand
side of water management.”
Yet entering the home stretch, much of the
optimism faded. It became apparent that the
primary result of the project would be the
publication of academic papers, to which policy-
makers paid little attention. What caused this
dramatic shift? Years after the project ended, Earl
and Gillespie’s interviews with both project
researchers and Tunisian officials shed some light
on the matter.
The interviews reveal researchers’ critical view of
their counterparts in government — with
government officials similarly disdainful of the
researchers’ approach. This state of mutual distrust
conforms to theorist Nathan Caplan’s “two
communities” hypothesis, which holds that the
research community and the bureaucracy are often
separated by significant differences in behaviour,
expectations, and perceptions.
One Ministry of Agriculture official acknowledges
that such a cultural divide does exist in Tunisia. He
suggests that the rift could be mended if there was
more contact between the two groups at
dissemination events, and if both sides modified
their approaches. Academic researchers, he says,
need to do a better job at summarizing their
research (so that busy bureaucrats can read it)
and should take on more applied research.
Policymakers, on the other hand, should
communicate more clearly the problems they
need to have answered.
Indirect impacts on policy
Does the failure of the researchers to forge a direct
link with policymakers mean that the project was a
failure?
The way that events have unfolded since the
project ended suggests that the likely answer is
“no.” Within Tunisia, water demand management
has become a supporting plank in the
government’s water policy — one of three
interlocking approaches to managing this critical
resource. More broadly, the Water Demand
Management Forum (WDMF) has moved the issue
to centre stage, through conferences involving
participants from eleven countries in the region.
A cornerstone of WDM is the role of economic
analysis and economic instruments in promoting
conservation. While this approach is now widely
accepted, it was new when Prof. Matoussi
championed it in Tunisia in the early 1990s.
All this indicates that, in the longer term, the
Tunisian researchers’ ideas did filter into the
policy-making sphere.
Evert Lindquist has examined the ability of
research to influence policy through circuitous,
indirect means. One of those means is expanding
policy capacities — that is, facilitating the creation
of knowledge or competence in individuals or
organizations that can later be put to use in some
other context.
The WDM in Tunisia project clearly created such
an expansion of capacity by allowing Prof. Matoussi,
a leading innovator in the application of economic
theory to water management, to refine his
approach and methods. The project also supported
a number of graduate students examining the
same issues. Cumulatively, this support led to Prof.
Matoussi’s ideas having a sustained presence in
the country and in the region. Writes Tuplin: “IDRC
support to this project helped to create the first
group in Tunisia with the capacity to analyze water
issues from a quantitative economics perspective.”
Lindquist also notes that research can have a
longer-term influence over policy by broadening
policy horizons. In other words, researchers can
put new concepts into circulation that may
stimulate policymakers to frame issues in different
ways or engage in different types of debates.
Again, there is evidence that WDM in Tunisia did
this. As David Brooks, the IDRC project officer
during the latter part of the project observed, its
emphasis on water demand brought policymakers
into contact with an approach that seemed radical
at the time it was first raised.
Through their involvement in water networks,
however, project participants were able to advance
the idea that water demand is not a fixed factor (as
it had been assumed) but a variable that would
respond to economic pressures. Within Tunisia,
team members have interacted with the National
Society for Water Exploitation and Distribution
(SONEDE), while regionally Prof. Matoussi has
been active in the Water Demand Management
Forum, which has made policy influence one of its
major concerns.
Looking for direct links
But are these indirect influences on policy the best
that researchers could have hoped for? Was it
inevitable that WDM in Tunisia would fall short of
its goal of directly influencing policymakers during
the project’s tenure?
Earl and Gillespie’s post-mortem of the project
provides some instructive ideas about how
productive links between researchers and
policymakers can be cultivated. Their findings
indicate that this project’s failure to reach
policymakers in the short term was likely not
because the task was too daunting, but rather
because the right strategies were not followed.
There was, for example, no clear plan on how to
communicate the research findings. Highly
technical documents were not translated into
popular language that would have made project
results understandable to non-mathematicians.
Although workshops were held, they were aimed
primarily at academic audiences. Similarly, the
researchers’ papers were published in academic
journals, some of which were not available in
Tunisia. All this was compounded by restrictions
on Internet access, which scuttled plans for a
project website.
In turn, the failure to develop a communications
plan appears to have deeper roots in the project’s
design. The team was dominated by specialists,
and lacked a member specifically responsible for
dealing with policymakers. Additionally, since
researchers were offered minimal compensation,
the ability to publish academic papers became a
more important reward for their work. Translating
their findings into policy-friendly language was not
something the researchers saw as their role.
Tuplin writes that norms have changed since WDM
in Tunisia was launched. Now, IDRC and its
partners pay more attention to the policy and
communications dimensions of projects. “Today,”
she suggests, “IDRC may look for ‘policy
entrepreneurs’ or people able to advocate change
and adept at reading the environment both inside
and outside government.”
Overall, what’s become clear is that drawing out
the policy implications of research and
communicating them to the people who steer the
ship of public policy are not things that will
happen on their own. Rather, they are crucial tasks
that must be planned and budgeted for from the
outset of research projects.
Writes Tuplin: “Research alone, no matter how
good, is not enough to draw policymakers’
attention to important and relevant issues.”
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 There are long-term and short-term ways to influence policy. A research project that lacks a direct and
immediate influence on policymakers may have an impact over the longer term. For example,
research could contribute to expanding the capacity of policymakers to integrate new approaches
and practices. It could also broaden the horizons of other researchers, so that they will be able to
bring new knowledge to bear on the problems they are studying.
 A research team should include members who can express results in policy-friendly ways.
 Communication efforts should be planned and budgeted for — they will not happen on their own.
 Projects should provide researchers with incentives to focus on the policy implications of their
research. It is important that researchers have a better understanding of the role they can play in the
creation of sound public policy.
Some lessons
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a Canadian public corporation, created to help
developing countries find solutions to the social, economic, and natural resource problems they face. Support is
directed to building an indigenous research capacity. Because influencing the policy process is an important
aspect of IDRC’s work, in 2001 the Evaluation Unit launched a strategic evaluation of more than 60 projects in
some 20 countries to examine whether and how the research it supports influences public policy and decision-
making.The evaluation design and studies can be found at: www.idrc.ca/evaluation_policy
